With this attack, the idea is the same as with Kerberoasting
Any authenticated user can request a Service Ticket (ST) for a registered Service Principal Name (SPN) to the Ticket Granting Service (TGS)
This service ticket will be encrypted with a key derived from the password for which the given SPN is registered. The TGS will respond with a TGS_REP containing that service ticket and an encrypted part
An operator can obtain a crackable hash from the issued service ticket and try to crack it in order to obtain the plain password for the related service account
On Targeted Kerberoast, an attacker controls an account which has GenericAll, GenericWrite, WriteProperty or Validated-SPN over another domain account
Then, it leverages any of these rights to add an SPN attribute to the target account. Once the SPN is added, it automatically becomes susceptible for Kerberoasting
Once a service ticket is requested for the registered SPN, the latter should be deleted from the target account
User A has GenericWrite over User B and leverages this right to set a temporal SPN to User B in order to request a Service Ticket for that SPN and crack the resulting hash
If AES encryption flags are enabled in the UserAccountControl attribute of the target account and any of the existent DCs is a Windows Server 2016 or below, simply use the /tgtdeleg option to ensure downgrade encryption and receive a service ticket encrypted-signed with RC4_HMAC_MD5